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1Introduction: The Pedagogical 
Obstacle of the Phenomenal 
Forms
An ongoing project
This book is a further development from a previous one, published 
only in Spanish, whose title can be translated as The Copernican turn 
and the social sciences (Villacañas de Castro, 2013). It was a philo-
sophical work relating to a general epistemological problem lying at 
the heart of the social and natural sciences. On the other hand, the 
present volume is firmly rooted in pedagogy. This difference reflects 
the professional journey that I have made in the meantime, from 
being a Graduate Student at a Faculty of Philosophy to becoming a 
member of staff at a Faculty of Education, where I currently lecture 
and carry out research. Despite the various shifts brought about by 
this transition, an underlying interest has remained throughout and 
inspired me to write this volume. This is why I consider both books 
to be part of a single, ongoing project.
Accordingly, the first aim of this introduction is to make the 
nature—the essence—of the continuity I am alluding to clear, an 
objective which cannot be satisfied without summarizing (no matter 
how briefly) The Copernican turn and the social sciences. This summary 
should prepare the reader for the original contribution that I make in 
the following five chapters. Accordingly, the first three sections of this 
introduction present some of the ideas developed in that earlier work, 
while the last three begin to deal with those developed in this one.
Let us start with my previous book. My aim then was to analyze 
a problem which I considered to be no less than an epistemological 
mystery, or enigma, presented by those revolutionary theories which, 
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2   Critical Pedagogy and Marx, Vygotsky and Freire
in my view, had enacted a Copernican turn in the realm of the sciences. 
Four scientific theories fell within the scope of that concept: Sigmund 
Freud’s psychoanalysis, Karl Marx’s contribution to sociology, Neo-
Darwinism (the paradigm which ensued when Darwin’s and Mendel’s 
discoveries in biology were articulated), and relativity theory in the 
field of physics. I assume readers possess some basic notions of them, 
although this is not necessary to understand this project. I defined 
these Copernican turns as scientific discoveries whose revolutionary 
nature consisted precisely of the fact that they had contributed new 
knowledge about particular objects (the psychic apparatus, the mode 
of production, the natural habitat, and the universe) but also about 
the position that human beings held in relation to those realities, 
insofar as they formed part of them. Actually, an individual crystal-
lized where these four objects intersected. A Copernican turn thus 
involved two kinds of knowledge: about the object and the subject; 
knowledge about specific realities; and also new knowledge about 
how human beings should understand themselves in relation to 
those four objects. All four Copernican turns revealed that human 
beings were neither independent nor separate from the realities 
which they studied, but were inscribed in them, embedded in their 
materiality. Instead of downplaying the objective quality of outside 
reality in order to stress its subjective side, this argument focused on 
the objective quality of dimensions to which the human being had 
normally attributed a subjective character.
Copernican turns
Many consequences unfolded from this ontological argument. For 
instance, the scrutiny which scientists professed to exercise with 
neutrality and detachment suddenly seemed to be epistemologically 
unsound, since it developed from within the subject matter under 
analysis. The ‘positivistic myth of the researcher as detached secretary 
to the universe’, as Kemmis and McTaggart (2005, p. 570) described 
it, forcefully crumbled down. At the same time, dimensions which 
humanity had always interpreted as evidence of its own exceptional 
mode of existence in the world (of its own transcendence from the 
natural plane) were suddenly revealed to be connected to objective, 
material developments. As one may imagine, all sorts of sentiments 
were stirred against those discoveries. Although he did not refer to 
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them as Copernican turns (and left Marx’s theory out of his analysis), 
at one point in his later work Sigmund Freud described the impact 
of these theories (including his own, psychoanalysis) as inflicting 
narcissistic blows to humanity, an expression which he pulled from 
his own theory, and through which he attempted to stress their 
traumatic character. ‘The universal narcissism of men, their self-
love’, Freud (1917) said, ‘has up to the present suffered three severe 
blows from the researches of science […]: the cosmological one […], 
the biological blow to human narcissism [… and], the third blow, 
which is psychological in nature, [and] probably the most wounding’ 
(pp. 3612–13). It seemed as if science had unveiled a kind of knowl-
edge that challenged the privileged position that human individuals 
had presumed to hold in history and in the universe.
Freud was not the first to identify this resistance, of course. Darwin, 
Einstein, Marx—all of them had to face fanatical opposition to their 
discoveries. Centuries before them, Galileo even experienced danger 
when he bore out Copernicus’ heliocentric cosmological model, the 
first Copernican turn proper and the discovery which set in motion 
a process that Einstein would draw to an end. In the 18th century, 
philosopher Immanuel Kant approached this experience again from 
a philosophical perspective. His observations on Copernicus’ original 
hypothesis of the Earth orbiting around the Sun formulated, for the 
first time, the structure of Copernican turns. On account of the preci-
sion of his commentary, I have always kept it at the heart of my own 
theoretical developments:
We have here the same case as with the first thought of 
Copernicus, who, not being able to get on in the explanation of 
the movements of the heavenly bodies, as long as he assumed that 
all the stars turned round the spectator, tried whether he could 
not succeed better, by assuming the spectator to be turning round, 
and the stars to be at rest. (Kant, 2001, p. 12)
As I have mentioned, centuries later, Marx, Darwin, Freud, and 
Einstein became perfectly aware of the cognitive and affective conse-
quences effected by their turns. They anticipated the resistance which 
their contemporary and future generations would per force undergo, 
as people tried to accommodate their commonsensical, superficial 
impressions to the ideas implied by these scientific breakthroughs—or 
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more concretely, as they attempted to see themselves in terms of the 
concrete dynamics which ruled their own divided mental apparatus, 
the mode of production, the natural habitat, and the surrounding 
universe in which they worked, reproduced, and lived. Since then, 
the only factor which has proven capable of attenuating the enmity 
raised against these theories has been downright ignorance, lack 
of acquaintance with them—something which could actually be 
interpreted as a kind of resistance in itself. Yet neither Freud, Marx, 
Darwin nor Einstein developed a profound epistemological reflec-
tion on this topic. None of them made the leap from a scientific to a 
meta-scientific plane of thought. This being the case, when I started 
to analyze the nature of Copernican turns, I had to come up with 
my own terminology and ways of illustrating my argument. This is 
not to say that I found no guidance in other authors; for example, 
I resorted constantly to the works of Thomas Kuhn (his theorization 
of paradigm shifts) and Louis Althusser (his analysis of Marx’s change 
of problematic), among others. But in the end it was Kant’s previous 
quote which proved to be the most determining influence on my 
own understanding, and set the terms of my discussion. Following 
suit from it, I ended up describing Copernican turns as if, at some 
point in the course of a scientific investigation, the observer had 
gradually started to question his or her own subjective position vis-
à-vis the object of inquiry; and as if, in addition, this revision had 
ended up becoming instrumental for discovering something radically 
new in the nature of the object. The subjective and the objective 
dimensions of this epistemological process were both integrated into 
my perspective, since they characterize a revolutionary scientific 
development that can, in fact, only be explained as a dialogue or an 
interaction between the two.
Let me bring the discussion to a more general plane, by remind-
ing the reader that it is only when we know exactly which place we 
occupy in reality that we can establish with certainty how much 
more our concrete perceptions owe to the essence of the real objects 
we are observing than to our local position. What is more, there is 
no question that some vantage points simply make it impossible for 
the real facts of a situation to be accessed and truthfully conveyed by 
our impressions. Indeed, this idea is closely tied to the Copernican 
breakthrough, for it was only when these scientific observers were 
able to know themselves—to know humanity—fully that they could 
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access new knowledge of the world. They did so by discounting 
that which, in the way they perceived it, was affected by the way 
the world impacted on them qua observers. In Villacañas de Castro 
(2013), I chose to describe this expansion of the individual’s self-
awareness in terms of a part (the subject, the scientific observer) 
comprehending better the whole to which he or she belonged (the 
object, reality), a whole which did not translate itself properly in any 
one act of observation, and a subject which would never cease to be 
a part of it, including during the knowledge process. At the end of 
the day, these scientific accomplishments implied that the scientific 
observers had not only come to understand the ontological truth 
they formed part of the same reality they wanted to investigate 
(a psychic apparatus, the mode of production, a natural habitat, or 
the universe); but also that they had found a rational way of dealing 
adequately with this fact, in the form of a method which allowed 
them to overcome the epistemological obstacles that ensued.
Phenomenal forms
That book found a name to call the epistemological obstacles I am 
referring to: the Erscheinungsformen (which is rendered into English 
equally well as forms of manifestation or phenomenal forms), a term 
which ended up becoming as important to the book’s line of reason-
ing as the Copernican turns. Originally formulated in the context of 
Karl Marx’s sociological investigations, the phenomenal forms also 
appear in the title of the present volume, so the reader may well 
consider them to be the true leitmotiv of this ongoing project. This 
work approaches them from a different standpoint, so let me make 
this new orientation explicit. While The Copernican turn and the social 
sciences dealt with the epistemological effects that derived from the 
phenomenal forms, Critical Pedagogy and Marx, Vygotsky and Freire: 
Phenomenal Forms and Educational Action Research focuses on their 
pedagogical effects. In other words, while the first book analyzed the 
threats and difficulties that phenomenal forms posed to the advance-
ment of scientific knowledge, and how Marx, Freud, Darwin, and 
Einstein contributed to overcoming them through their Copernican 
turns, the present work explores the threats and difficulties that the 
Erscheinungsformen pose to teaching and learning, and how educators 
should negotiate these obstacles properly to make any knowledge 
Copyrighted material – 978–1–137–56243–2
Copyrighted material – 978–1–137–56243–2
6   Critical Pedagogy and Marx, Vygotsky and Freire
related to the objects conceptualized through those radical discover-
ies be understood and learned.
The previous lines provide a clear-cut definition of the aims of this 
book. Nevertheless, for the reader to get an even clearer idea of its con-
tent, a specific comment on the phenomenal forms seems worthwhile. 
Generally speaking, the concept refers to the distorted ways in which 
reality necessarily presents itself to the individuals who experience it 
from within, ways which do not translate—except untruthfully—the 
underlying nature of the real objects observed. The theoretical link 
between phenomenal forms and Copernican turns is straightforward, 
since the latter were the scientific advances through which four differ-
ent sciences were able to overcome the distorted mirages which until 
then had enveloped them. If I were to devise a metaphor to illustrate 
the obstacles presented by the phenomenal forms, I would say that our 
own attempts at understanding reality always seem to find us in the 
way, and vice versa: our attemtps at understanding ourselves always 
seem to find reality (nature, society, the unconscious) in the way. Our 
material anchorage in reality seems to bar us from understanding 
properly how this anchorage is articulated, preventing us from know-
ing the world properly, and therefore ourselves. As such, phenomenal 
forms also imply that there exists a gap between how processes really 
develop and how they end up being perceived by human observers. 
This gap is expressed, epistemologically, as the existence of two kinds 
of knowledge: ideological and scientific, according to Marx; pheno-
typic and genetic, in Vygotskyan terms; implicit and explicit, as Fals-
Borda (1991a, p. 146) called them. Throughout this book, I prefer to 
formulate the issue in terms of Vygotsky’s dichotomy. Hence, while 
genetic knowledge is about the deeper processes and underlying 
causes of real phenomena, knowledge of the first kind concerns only 
their superficial and distorted manifestations. Well inscribed in this 
second level of knowledge, phenomenal forms consist precisely of the 
distorted and deceitful mirages through which the mental apparatus, 
the mode of production, the habitat, or the universe—for example—
are perceived and represented spontaneously in the minds of the same 
human spectators who form part of each and every one of them.
This situation can be described equally well in terms of the rela-
tionship between the part and the whole or the effects and the cause. 
Either way, it is only when we realize that we are but the effects of 
objective causes that lay well hidden in the nature and the history 
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of the very objects which we wish to understand, do we finally come 
across the real complexity of the epistemological (and pedagogical) 
problems posed by phenomenal forms. The prospect of solving it is 
made worse once we realize that science often attempts to understand 
reality in total ignorance of the subject/object dialectic explained 
above, as well as of its grave epistemological consequences. And it is 
also at this moment when the radical significance of the Copernican 
turns is adequately appreciated. The revolutionary nature of the 
discoveries and the theories that Freud, Marx, Darwin, and Einstein 
contributed to human development has to do with the way they 
cut through the superficial representations of the abovementioned 
objects to access their deeper and constituting developments at the 
same time as they articulated the observer’s participation in them.
The pedagogical obstacle
Up till now this introduction has dealt only with ideas which are 
contained in The Copernican turn and the social sciences, but from this 
point on it will unfold arguments that (though stemming from those) 
the reader will find in the present volume. To put it briefly, this book 
describes (1) how the aforesaid epistemological obstacles posed by 
the phenomenal forms become translated into pedagogical ones, 
which impinge on the essential purposes of education; and (2) which 
pedagogical orientations are best suited to solve these problems, and 
why.
It will be obvious from the book’s title that three authors have 
been especially influential in attempting to fulfill these goals: 
Marx, Vygotsky, and Freire. The works of the first two provided the 
main cornerstones for unfolding the first issue, related as it is with 
the transfer of the epistemological obstacle into the pedagogical 
dimension. Freire’s ideas, on the other hand, are the hinge connect-
ing this argument with the second one, through which the book 
finally engages critical pedagogy, signaled as the most suitable peda-
gogical orientation for remediating the havoc played with education 
by phenomenal forms. Finally, the book justifies why participatory 
action research may possibly be the most effective educational con-
cretion of this pedagogical orientation. I believe all three issues stem 
from a single line of reasoning and follow from the same logical 
argument. From the very first chapter the reader will see how the 
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discussion of these pedagogical obstacles involves exactly the same 
elements as those through which I have just described the epistemo-
logical ones, and which Copernican turns were able to overcome: the 
subject/object dialectics, the relationship between the part and the 
whole, or the connection between the effects and the cause. Not by 
chance, the same factors which obstructed the advancement of scien-
tific knowledge obstruct teaching and learning. Hence the unsurpris-
ing fact that ‘both critical pedagogy and action research grew out of 
a critique of traditional empirical research and traditional pedagogy’, 
according to Wamba (2010, p. 173).
The resulting question is: how can a corresponding Copernican 
turn be effected in the field of pedagogy? Before I develop this 
answer fully, however, let me explain how the epistemological 
conundrum translates itself into pedagogical terms. Basically, in this 
case the problem lies in that students cannot learn and apply the 
knowledge of the subject matters tackled by Freud, Marx, Darwin, or 
Einstein without learning, at the same time, about themselves. It is 
impossible to separate both spheres insofar as the students are part 
of the objective realities they need to learn about. ‘There is no way 
of separating the knowing subject from the object to be known. […] 
The knowledge of something is also, simultaneously, a self knowl-
edge’ (Santoro Santos, 2005, pp. 7–17). On account of this, becoming 
acquainted with the divided structure of the psychic apparatus, or 
with the class-ridden nature of a mode of production, or with the 
ecologic and genetic variables which come into play in determining 
the destiny of any given species (including ours) within a biological 
habitat, or finally with the relationship between space, time, and 
energy in the cosmos—any of these educational processes, as well 
as the transformative effects that may ensue from them—implies a 
vital experience in which students’ self-definition and self-image is 
caught up. In itself, this need not be problematic, however. The real 
pedagogical problem comes when these learning experiences are too 
negative or traumatic, as they necessarily are from the moment when 
these theories demand students to push their own narcissism and 
individualistic perspectives aside, to de-center themselves, and rather 
think of themselves in terms of being part of four concrete subject 
matters. At that moment, negative reactions will arise. Resistances, 
both cognitive and affective, will be put up. And it is reasonable that 
it be so. We should bear in mind that Vygotsky’s earlier distinction 
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between phenotypic and genotypic kinds of knowledge (superfi-
cial or profound) also applies to the knowledge one holds true of 
him- or herself, that is, to the representations through which one 
pictures his or her own place in reality, and his or her relationship 
with it. Indeed, as affirmed by Santoro Santos (2005), ‘changes that 
take place in [one’s] significations of the world […] essentially imply 
changes in [one’s] perspective as a subject’ (p. 17). The content of 
both significations is neither arbitrary nor unmotivated, of course, 
but grounded in an accumulated history of experiences taking place 
within immediate surroundings. In some way they show, according 
to Balibar (2007), ‘the way in which reality (a certain form or social 
structure) cannot but appear’ (p. 60).
Now, if phenomenal forms built on dialogue with the external 
world are accompanied by corresponding ones arising from our 
contact with ourselves, the latter will be more or less superficial or 
distorted depending on the extent to which they move beyond an 
individualistic and subjectivist understanding and articulate them-
selves with the real structure and processes ruling the surrounding 
world. As Rozas (2007) claimed as a comment on Freire’s work: ‘We 
come to know ourselves only when we come to know the world’ 
(p. 565). He or she who ignores the world will ignore him- or herself 
also. He or she who, for example, tends to obliterate the effects of 
class-division within a given social milieu will also tend to overem-
phasize the role that personal initiative and individual merit play 
in gaining a certain social position and life standard. As a result, 
the chances are that he or she will also hold individuals (him- or 
herself included) responsible for a social destiny which Marxian 
sociology, by contrast, makes institutions accountable for. The reason 
why I have chosen this example is because this book deals mainly 
with the pedagogical obstacles derived from the phenomenal forms 
through which students portray their social reality and their place 
within it, and hence with those which are likely to arise as they 
become acquainted with the sociological outlook which was defi-
nitely capable of overcoming them: the Marxian one, with its focus 
on social class. This is also the perspective adopted by most of the 
critical educational literature I have taken into account to write this 
book. Besides, it was in relation to this Copernican turn precisely 
that Freire’s pedagogical contribution was most meaningful. And 
yet, a similar conflict involving contradictory perspectives is bound 
Copyrighted material – 978–1–137–56243–2
Copyrighted material – 978–1–137–56243–2
Copyrighted material – 978–1–137–56243–2
Copyrighted material – 978–1–137–56243–2
10   Critical Pedagogy and Marx, Vygotsky and Freire
to appear in the teaching and learning processes oriented towards 
any of the subject matters whose scientific examination underwent 
a Copernican turn—the natural habitat, for example, the knowledge 
and sustainable transformation of which ecopedagogy (Kahn, 2009) 
attempts to ensure. On some occasions, this book will also draw on 
the other three subject matters evoked above, and use their key con-
cepts as metaphors to illustrate educational inquiries into the object 
of study privileged by critical pedagogy.
With all this in mind, the pedagogical problem originated by 
the conflict between pre-phenotypic and genetic standpoints, pre-
Copernican and post-Copernican views of the individual and the 
world, is no other than student resistance to knowledge. This resistance 
may take up many forms and lead to many negative educational 
outcomes. Because of this, it should not be confused with those nega-
tive students’ reactions that arise from their discomfort towards the 
way a teacher teaches and organizes learning. The two dimensions are 
connected, and I will dwell on the inextricability of this relationship 
later on—indeed, the pedagogical relationship mediates the learners’ 
conceptual relationship with the reality in which they are situated, 
since it is through their relationship with the teacher that the world 
is unveiled and becomes known. The specific kind of resistance I am 
alluding to develops as an ideological reaction against certain ideas 
and contents, rather than against the way they are taught. It therefore 
results from the trauma of being exposed to a theoretical perspective 
which is radically different from ones’ own, yet essential for one’s self-
understanding. Against profound narcissistic blows—to recall Freud’s 
words—the individual resists. From occupying class standpoints, the 
individual’s ego defends itself, to put it in the words of Cho (2009, 
p. 93). Learning and resistance to learning imply a cognitive side—
phenomenal forms contain blind spots and distortions—but also an 
affective side. Students’ cultural representations always reach back 
to concrete life experiences, to singular moments of learning taking 
place within their immediate surroundings. If not handled properly 
by the educator, the affective dimension may end up placing the 
whole educative process at a halt or even under risk of breaking 
down. Of course, this resistance can be toned down, negotiated, and 
re-oriented by pedagogy, if educators expose students to traumatic 
knowledge only in certain appropriate ways, as opposed to others. 
This is precisely the solution we are looking for.
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The pedagogical solution: critical pedagogy 
and educational action research
I am now in a position to introduce the second main contribution 
of this book. Based on what has been said till now, the question 
concerning which pedagogical orientations are best suited to over-
come student resistance can receive a justified answer: namely, those 
which attend to the subjective and the objective inertias that shape 
students’ lives and knowledge. But this is too abstract an answer, and 
needs to be broken down before it can offer any practical advice. 
What I mean by it is, in the first place, that educators must inter-
nalize and put into practice what we have emphasized so much: 
namely, that students participate materially in the same realities that 
we ask them to understand and learn about. But, secondly, teachers 
must also realize that this participation (on account of the dynamics 
of the phenomenal forms) is never experienced as such, but rather 
concealed from spontaneous experience and from the implicit or 
commonsense knowledge that is associated with it. In point of fact, 
according to Marx’s suggestions in The German Ideology and through-
out Capital, phenomenal forms show things in the opposite light to 
the way they are. Actually, social phenomenal forms tend to rein-
force individualistic perspectives and understandings vis-à-vis the 
social reality implied.
Complex as this reasoning already is, this book asks educators to 
complete it with further pedagogical awareness. Essential to the suc-
cess of their educational endeavor is that they realize that the objec-
tive dimension I have just attributed to students does not cancel out 
the need for the educational process to proceed through the liberal 
principles of freedom, equality, and tolerance. Actually, the opposite is 
the case. In contrast to the trend that Allman (2009) noticed among 
some radical educators in Britain, this argument claims that the most 
challenging content-knowledge can only be attained through the 
most democratic pedagogical processes. In other words, educators 
will only foster their students’ understanding of their own objective 
nature by engaging in the most humane pedagogy. This logic was 
already anticipated in Althusser’s double demand for theoretical 
anti-humanism and practical humanism, a statement which loses 
its apparent contradiction the moment one understands the second 
clause as a pedagogical proviso. When read this way, the statement 
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seems to suggest that Marxist socialism should not dispense with 
including certain humanist or liberal principles at the core of its 
political and educational pedagogy. Individual freedom, equality, 
tolerance had to be reinforced even more strongly if the teaching 
process was to reverse the cognitive and pedagogical effects of the 
phenomenal forms, and thus bridge the gap between students’ ‘com-
mon sense’ and ‘good sense’, to say it in Gramsci’s words.
Let me explore this point in more depth. It is a well-known fact 
that, in order for students to transition from their original cognitive 
background to the attainment of academic capabilities, teaching 
processes must integrate their original cultural wealth in a sig-
nificant way. ‘When students witness the validation of their culture 
within the educational process, they concatenate their identities as 
family members, students and emergent intellectuals. Moreover, 
the cultural substance of their identities feeds and sustains an aca-
demic persona’ (Cammarota & Romero, 2011, p. 492). Freire never 
tired of mentioning this too. As stated by Araujo Freire and Macedo 
(2000), ‘By respecting and starting from common sense, Freire 
proposes to overcome it’ (p. 8). This means that, while inscribed in 
phenotypic levels of knowledge, students’ experiences and culture 
must be valued by the educator and appraised for the wealth and 
reality which they contain, hence also validated as a suitable point 
for students to continue with their learning process. This is as true 
for formal educational contexts as it is for non-academic ones, such 
as oppressed rural and urban communities that have traditionally 
been the focus of participatory action research initiatives. There 
too, ‘valuing and applying folk culture’ (Fals-Borda, 1991b, p. 8) is a 
necessary technique for success. Yet what I am especially interested 
in clarifying is the key role that freedom, equality, and tolerance 
play in this transition. Regarding these principles, the first thing 
to bear in mind is that, unlike humanistic or liberal educational 
traditions, this book justifies them for their pedagogical value and 
not on the grounds of philosophical, ethical or political planes of 
meaning (although it is not necessarily opposed to them either). 
In other words, I am only considering their pedagogical potential. 
In fact, liberal and humanistic political or ethical viewpoints are 
completely external to my own. My only claim is that the objec-
tive determinations which underpin students’ phenotypic repre-
sentations can only be properly tackled and reversed if teachers 
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and students build their mutual relationships on the principles of 
freedom, tolerance, and equality.
When critical pedagogy follows these principles, it may find its 
goals hard to attain. When it does not, its goals become simply 
impossible. Only in the first case can the ideological inertias be 
reversed, and the traumatic experience which certain learning 
processes involve be adequately negotiated. Impossible as it is for 
the educator to avoid some of the negative consequences that 
derive from challenging students’ phenomenal forms, authoritarian, 
transmission-like, teacher-oriented methodologies are likely to 
impede any learning whatsoever. This is due to the fact that, 
while the cognitive side of learning has normally been considered 
compatible with educators transferring knowledge to the students 
(as if the latter were mere recipients, vessels devoid of all affects 
and knowledge), the moment one bears in mind the importance of 
students’ affects and identities, one also realizes that this orientation, 
simply, cannot work. And the reason why it cannot work is that no 
educator can impose upon a student the traumatic experience that 
true knowledge involves. If trauma, according to Giroux (1997), can 
ever become a ‘useful pedagogical tool, [as] the pedagogical moment 
when identities become unsettled, provoking both anxiety and the 
opportunity to rethink political nature and moral content of one’s 
[…] identity’ (p. 293), it will only do so under the condition that 
educators don’t add an extra negative layer onto the students’ experi-
ence by embracing an authoritarian pedagogical orientation which 
forces them to assume passivity and silence as the only means to 
encounter new ideas which threaten them.
It is precisely due to the need for educators to respect the objectivity 
of the affective dimension—the algorithms of feeling, as Fals-Borda 
(1991a, p. 150) put it—that the principles of freedom, equality, 
and tolerance must remain active in educational contexts. These 
principles must define the teaching methodology. Not by chance did 
Freire’s theory of conscientization, so influential in the field of critical 
pedagogy and in participatory action research, insist on democratic 
forms of research and collective action (for example: Cammarota & 
Fine, 2008; Fals-Borda, 1991; Flores-Kastaris et al., 2009; Glassman 
& Erdem, 2014; McIntyre, 2008; Gullion, & Ellis, 2014; Thomson 
& Hunter, 2009). The need to combine critique and liberal prin-
ciples (something rarely done by orthodox socialist pedagogies) 
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may thus prevent educators from being ‘theoretically […] correct 
and pedagogically wrong’, in the words of Giroux (2006, p. 63), or to 
‘establish a contradiction (a logical one) between their methods and 
their objectives’, in Allman’s (2009, p. 428). The unity of critique, 
freedom, and tolerance should stem from the realization that the 
aforementioned affective and cognitive transitions can only be 
made by the individual learner acting upon him- or herself, and not 
by the teacher. In other words, it derives from recognizing certain 
limits to the educators’ power to ensure the learning process. Unlike 
what is often assumed of knowledge—that it can be imposed—
educators must realize that they cannot enforce certain feelings or 
emotions on their students in relation to certain contents, at least 
not those which may be conducive to learning. In this respect at 
least, they are impotent, and it is desirable that they remain so. The 
transitions on which learning depends lies in the hands of each 
individual student, who must build the bridge across from his or 
her original cultural experiences (and the affects attached to them) 
to the new ones. Hence the impossible nature of presuming to 
organize a successful learning process against the students, without 
their active participation and involvement, or by assigning them a 
passive role.
‘Allowing students to participate in constructing the learning 
process’, Romero et al. (2008) claim, ‘encourages them to perceive 
education as their project, something they can create. […] No longer 
do they sit passively waiting to be told what to do; they realize that 
they too have something to offer education and society’ (p. 136). 
If the success of the affective transition depends on whether or not 
students are given the opportunity to participate actively in their 
learning process, this in turn will only occur provided that, as this 
quote shows, a significant degree of freedom and equality (expressed 
in terms of participation) is shared among all the agents involved in 
it, teachers and students equally. Herein lies the essential pedagogi-
cal role I attribute to those democratic principles, whose significance 
in the affective dimension has also been explored. Psychoanalyst 
Jacques Lacan (2007), for instance, once alluded to the impossibility 
of forcing someone else to desire, and the same holds true for learn-
ing, a process in which students will only give worth to those feelings 
they have experienced freely and to the cognitive content to which 
those feelings attach. In this regard psychoanalysis (a Copernican 
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turn itself) undoubtedly lends educators a valuable hand which 
this book also tries to underscore. Just as therapy proceeds to over-
come repression—by allowing the patients to freely talk themselves 
through transference and the symbolic paths of their unconscious 
libido—only if students are allowed to express themselves truly along 
the educational process, through words or actions, will they be able 
to transfer the affects which clung originally to their previous, com-
monsensical experiences and cultural representations to the new 
scientific ones that, at first, were foreign and threatening to them. 
Only then may the cognitive and affective transitions take place, and 
understanding and action ensue.
The first transition lies in the hands of the educator, who must 
design and organize all the cultural elements involved in the edu-
cational context. Like architects, teachers organize contexts where 
experiences take place—educational contexts, in this case. And in the 
same way as a building only displays its beauty or its functionality 
to whomever inhabits it, educators must design their own contexts 
bearing in mind the agency of the learners who will act and think 
within them. From this perspective, learning consists of the knowl-
edge and skills that result from the educational experiences learners 
undergo in the context of an activity. Yet for the cultural elements 
that are present in it to crystallize into concrete learning, the students’ 
agency still remains the moving force. And the educator must be able 
to recruit it. In the end, the pedagogical orientations which enable 
students to traverse their own phenomenal forms are those which 
allow them to exercise their agency through verbal or non-verbal 
self-expressions in which affects as well as concepts become involved. 
Critical pedagogy becomes, thus, indivisible from critical literacy (Ada 
& Campoy, 2004; Ballester, 2015; Reyes Torres & Bird, 2015; Shor, 
2009), as it already was in Freire’s original cultural circles, where learn-
ers learnt how to read the word and the world. ‘Inquiry into narrative, 
stories lived and told, creates spaces, gaps, which allow for change’ 
(Pushor & Jean Clandinin, 2009, p. 292). By objectifying their cogni-
tive lines of thought, students open up a space within themselves 
for new learning to occur. And the more they express themselves, 
the more they will clear new ground that allows them to transform. 
Understanding the objective causes of our own individuality does not 
come as a sudden revelation or epiphany, but only through a guided 
but constant (and possibly never-ending) process of ‘objectification 
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of experience’, in the words of Kemmis and McTaggart (2005, p. 571). 
Naturally, dialogue and shared participation, not one-way instruction, 
must become the main educational tools.
Taking all this into account, one can barely be surprised by the 
fact that Part III of this book presents participatory action research 
as the ideal approach for critical pedagogy to realize its challenging 
educational aims. The same words which Carr and Kemmis (1986) 
at first applied to action research qualify also for critical pedagogy: 
‘it should not be seen as a recipe or technique for bringing about 
democracy, but rather as an embodiment of democratic principles in 
research’ (p. 164), or in pedagogy in this case. In point of fact, I find 
no clearer evidence of the pedagogical potential of freedom, toler-
ance and equality than those action research projects conducted in 
the field of education, which, by honoring these principles, increased 
also student participation without sacrificing the learning compo-
nent. The opposite was actually the case. Educational action research, 
which started as a framework of reflective inquiry for teachers to 
explore the underpinnings of their practice and experiment with 
curriculum design (Elliott, 1988; 1991; Stenhouse, 1981) revealed an 
extraordinary pedagogical potential once students were included as 
full researchers alongside educators. As Brydon-Miller et al. (2009) 
explain in their account of the participatory action research projects 
developed by the Institute for Community Research (ICR):
for the last nearly 20 years, the ICR has used a participatory action 
research approach to involve youth in their own research on 
issues of concern to them, by teaching them to utilize critical eth-
nographic methods including social mapping, digital photogra-
phy and video, various types of face-to-face interviews, cognitive 
mapping, and other data collection techniques. (p. 501)
This participatory variant of action research has proven capable of 
lifting the phenomenal veil from adults and young people alike, and 
of raising their awareness on decisive issues that shape their global 
perception of social reality. And, as the quote above suggested, it 
has done so especially by providing the opportunity for learners 
to conduct research projects around issues they perceived as being 
immediately related to their own lives and interests. The same degree 
of proximity has been maintained, in addition, for the rest of the 
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dimensions involved in these projects, which were accordingly con-
ducted by leading researchers who (despite frequently coming from 
academia) made sure that none of the people who took part in them 
felt detached or alienated from either the aims or the processes of the 
research—the goals, the language used, the ideas explored through-
out, the research tools, the ways of sharing the resulting knowledge, 
the activities developed, and finally from the relationships estab-
lished within the research team.
When all these conditions are satisfied, participatory action 
research projects naturally develop practical effects which affect the 
participants’ lives and, by extension, their communities. Due to the 
overlap between the investigated subject matter and the participants’ 
lives, the members of the research team learn about themselves as 
they explore a specific object of inquiry. They come to know more 
about themselves, about their surrounding reality, and about their real 
place in it. Furthermore, this cognitive processing is accompanied by 
parallel forms of identity and language expansion and self-awareness, 
of the sort that Freire understood by conscientization. It is not unu-
sual, thus, for poems, autobiographical narratives, or introspective 
essays (among other possible text types) to be generated during 
the research process, as verbal companions of other forms of social 
action. Through public exhibitions, talks, books, reports, and other 
examples of school or out-of-school intervention, the members in a 
participatory action research project may share the knowledge they 
have generated with an audience, and summarize the action steps 
taken. These outlets may be planned in advance or may simply arise 
organically from the research process, as the response to a certain 
need or problem addressed. Because of this, Cammarota and Romero 
(2011) claim that ‘participatory action research serves as a mediating 
pedagogical structure between lived context and learning through 
which students accurately identify and interpret the social influences 
shaping their experiences’ (p. 498). In this context, political or com-
munity action develops as a ‘corollary of heightened understanding 
and motivation’ (Kemmis & McTaggart, 2005, p. 571).
As a result, not only does participatory action research offer today 
a powerful reminder for critical pedagogues not to succumb to the 
authoritarian temptation, but its ability to foster knowledge con-
struction sets an example for what all teaching and learning should 
be in the future.
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Chapters of the book
This introduction has abstracted the main theses which the present 
book unfolds in each of its chapters. All five approach these ideas 
from different angles, by discussing a specific topic which gradually 
opens up to the whole argument. In addition, the chapters in the 
volume are distributed into three parts. Allow me now to present 
a summary of the contents of each chapter. The first one is called 
‘Beyond The ignorant schoolmaster: On education, Marxism, and psy-
choanalysis’, and it contains the book’s first engagement with the 
phenomenal forms. It sets the basic conceptual context in which the 
pedagogical problem and its solution will be explored later on. The 
chapter contends that any serious attempt to advance in the realm 
of critical pedagogy must integrate the discoveries issued by Marxism 
and psychoanalysis, two theories which identified and overcame 
the effects of specific phenomenal forms which interfered with the 
knowledge of the mode of production and the psychic apparatus. 
The chapter revises the educational proposal from the Enlightenment 
pedagogue Joseph Jacotot, written at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, as recounted in 1987 by philosopher Jacques Rancière in his 
book The ignorant schoolmaster. Five Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation. 
As the reader will see, Rancière’s analysis is only partially informed 
by the premises of Marxist sociology and Freudian psychoanalysis. 
Thus, Jacotot’s method of the ignorant schoolmaster—as Rancière 
calls it—is reviewed and assessed critically in conjunction with the 
fundamental theses of these two theories. The chapter argues that 
the teacher’s mobilizing of the student’s attention—the only resource 
Jacotot’s method used—cannot be conceived of in isolation from the 
influence of other two variables that, as the book tells us, also result 
in successful learning processes: desire and necessity. At the end of the 
day, the reason why Jacotot’s pedagogy should take into account the 
premises of Marxist sociology and psychoanalysis ultimately appears 
to be a consequence of the fact that these theories offer a scientific 
treatment of desire and necessity.
‘The pedagogical problem: Vygotsky’s encounter with the phe-
nomenal forms’ is the name of the second chapter. It describes the 
epistemological and pedagogical obstacle posed by Marx’s concept 
of phenomenal forms. Initially, the chapter dwells on how Lev 
Vygotsky regarded this concept as central to the original Marxian 
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paradigm, and deployed it as he developed his account of cognitive 
development in human beings. By analyzing the concept in depth, 
however, Chapter 2 soon reveals that its integration into cognitive 
psychology by Vygotsky was incomplete in crucial respects, and that 
pedagogical flaws were the result. In the process of exploring these 
shortcomings, the chapter contends that the pedagogical obstacle 
posed by the phenomenal forms may prove useful in explaining 
the transition between Vygotsky’s socio-constructivism and the sub-
sequent developments led by Paulo Freire’s critical pedagogy.
Chapter 3 takes up this hypothesis and develops it in the context 
of a discussion on political philosophy. ‘The pedagogical solution: 
Freire’s critical pedagogy and social democracy’ sets out to prove 
how Freire’s pedagogical project provided a solution to the problem 
caused by the phenomenal forms, but examines it against the back-
ground of the social democratic political project, in the belief that 
this joint examination will reveal a common underlying framework, 
and disclose the essential characteristics of Freire’s critical pedagogy. 
A concrete analysis of the revisionist debate which took place 
within the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) at the end of the 
19th century is developed, one which places special emphasis on 
the pedagogical arguments put forward by Eduard Bernstein. Most 
importantly, by reading these arguments in the light of Paulo Freire’s 
project, the chapter identifies the enormous pedagogical potential 
of principles such as individual freedom, equality, and tolerance, 
precisely in relation to the aim of overcoming the negative effects of 
the phenomenal forms. As a result, not only does the chapter suggest 
that social democracy is the most coherent political model in relation 
to the tenets of critical pedagogy, but it also demonstrates that the 
main strength of the social democratic project is pedagogical, and 
lies precisely in the respect it shows, in the political realm, for these 
principles of liberal origin.
Chapter 4, ‘The critical potential of John Elliott’s liberal pedagogy’ 
dwells even further on the complex relationship between critical 
pedagogy and liberal principles. This time it does so by exploring 
John Elliott’s procedural principles and the model of educational 
action research which he developed around it. The chapter starts 
by locating his work in the context of key ideological debates of 
the 20th century, and Elliott’s stand at this ideological crossroads is 
defined as liberal, on account of the way he tied his own educational 
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philosophy to the ethical sphere and to the means of education, in 
opposition to the learning of objective knowledge. The chapter then 
explores Elliott’s pedagogy from the point of view of the potential it 
may have to suggest an educational approach that, contrary to his 
(but in keeping with the aims of most critical pedagogues), defends 
the objectivity of the social sciences and the need for students to 
fulfill and attain certain content-goals. In contrast to Elliott’s inten-
tions, Chapter 4 finally arrives at the conclusion that the fact that 
students participate in the same social reality they must come to 
understand—a fact which generates the phenomenal forms—poses a 
number of emotional and cognitive obstacles which Elliott’s ethical 
principles were particularly well suited to overcome.
The volume concludes with its only experimental contribution: 
‘A practical case of participatory meta-action research’. It presents 
a case study of a project I had the privilege to lead, together with 
50 students, in a Master’s Course in Teacher Training in the University 
of Valencia (Spain). After introducing educational action research, 
Chapter 5 describes the critical incident that motivated the collective 
decision to start this research process, and then justifies the meta-
theoretical orientation that was selected as the best way to confront 
a pedagogical problem. The rest of the chapter illustrates how the 
project’s reflexive dimension unfolded through widening concentric 
circles, as the participants tied sociological, academic, and conceptual 
factors to the conflicting situation that they had set out to solve. By 
applying a meta-cognitive focus, important advances in learning 
ensued, and the pedagogical potential of this research method was 
thereby confirmed.
Early versions of Chapters 2, 4, and 5 appeared in the following 
journals under these titles, in article form: ‘A critique of Vygotsky’s 
Misapprehension of Marx’s phenomenal forms’, Science and Society 
(2015), 79 (1), pp. 90–113; ‘Epistemology and pedagogy re-examined: 
The unsuspected potential of John Elliott’s liberal pedagogy for 
teaching content-goals in the social and human sciences’, Teoría de la 
Educación (2014), 26 (2), pp. 93–113; and ‘Meta-action research with 
pre-service teachers: a case study’, Educational Action Research (2014), 
22 (4), pp. 534–51.
 Finally, let me acknowledge that this book is framed within the 
research project GV/2015/050, funded by the Conselleria d’Educació, 
Cultura i Esport of the Generalitat Valenciana (Spain).
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